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NOTES
STATUTE OF FRAUDS AS A DEFENSE TO INSUFFICIENT
REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS
By
DONALD

B.

WALTMAN*

In the case of Haskell v. Heathcote, 363 Pa. 184, 69 A.2d 71 (1949), the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, (concerning the Statute of Frauds), said,
"The object of the statute is to prevent the assertion of verbal understandings in the creation of interests or estates in land and to obviate the
opportunity for fraud and perjury. It is not a mere rule of evidence but
a declaration of public policy. In the absence of equities sufficient of themselves to take the case out of the statute, it operates as a limitation upon
judicial authority to afford a remedy unless renounced or waived by the
party entitled to claim its protection.
"In numerous equity cases arising both before and since promulgation of Pa. R. C. P. 1030, the practice of raising the Statute of Frauds by
preliminary objections has been permitted without question. There is
nothing in Equity Rule 92 or in the Rules of Civil Procedure to authorize or warrant a departure from this well established practice." (See also
Glen Alden Coal Co. v. State Tax Equal. Bd., 376 Pa. 63 at 66 (1951).
Lawyers are sometimes consulted concerning the adequacy of one or more
memos purporting to create an interest in land. This writing is concerned with the
use of preliminary objections' to test the sufficiency thereof within the purview of
the Statute of Frauds. A review of pertinent legal precedents becomes interesting
in view of the language of the Supreme Court in the case of Sawert v. Lunt 2 and
the reference therein to the prior but also recent cas-e of Suchan v. Swope.3
By filing preliminary objections the defendant admits temporarily the truth
of plaintiff's allegations but concurrently claims that there is a complete defense
4
thereto which does not require the production of evidence to sustain it.
Thus in raising the Statute of Frauds or Statute of Limitations 5 (Laches) in
his preliminary objections, defendant admits plaintiffs' allegations but in effect
says--"so what;" "the Statute will prevent or render useless the proof of these
*Member of the York County and Pennsylvania Bar Associations.
1 And its predecessor the "demurrer"-Heller v. Cochran, 280 Pa. 579 (1924).
2 360 Pa. 521; 63 A.2d 34 (1948).

3 357 Pa. 16; 53 A.2d 116 (1947).
4 Equity Rule 48.
6 Kinter v. C. W. Trust Co., 274 Pa. 437; Riley v. Boynton Coal Co., 305 Pa. 365; McKessen v.
Doyle, 312 Pa. 591; First Nat'l. Bank v. Lytle Coal Co., 332 Pa. 394; Sourber v. Gitt, 55 York L.R.
177; and see Ebbert Plymouth Oil Co., 348 Pa. 129; "The Statute of Limitations may be invoked
by demurrer in equity where the face of bill shows that it has run against the claim set up"-Hayes
Appeal-113 Pa. 380.
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allegations at a hearing;" "as a matter of law plaintiff has no case;" "his allegations
though true are not admissible or are not material." (But see contrary-discussion
in Sawert v. Lunt, supra).
A memo may be lacking in one or more contract essentials and thus insufficient
to establish an interest in real estate. The memo may lack designation of partyplaintiff; consideration; time for performance; or the subject matter of the contract,
the real estate itself. Maybe the memo is otherwise sufficient but lacks the name
of any village, town, township, or other municipal designation.
A fair reading of most of the cases under the statute would indicate that no
part of the contract or essential n'ecessary to establish a part of the contract can rest
on parol nor on other extrinsic evidence, much less can it rest on presumption. But
the courts, especially in recent years, have not so held.
Where one or more essentials of a contract are missing the court may refuse
relief saying it cannot make a contract for the parties. This usually occurs when
the consideration or the subject matter of the contract is omitted or not cleariy
stated. But where the time for performance is omitted or uncertain the courts apply
the "reasonable time" rule.
I. Description of Real Estate
Cases are most frequent which involve an inadequate description of real estate.
Pomeroy, in his "Specific Performance of Contracts" 3rd Edition, (1926), page
233, § 90, states the rule: "A contract to convey a certain quantity of land without
any means by which the boundaries can be ascertained is unenforceable."
Pennsylvania courts have held that,
"The memo must designate the land by name, adjoiner, monuments, natural boundaries, or by a reference to a deed, will, warranty
number, source of title or possession."6
A similar Pennsylvania rule is that,
"The description and other essential terms must be clear and capable
or ascertainment from the instrument itself."7
A Missouri court in Krilling v. Cramer, 133 S.W. 655 (1911)
as follows:

gave the test

"Could a surveyor with the memo in hand, and with the aid of no
other means than provided therein, go to the place stated therein, and
accurately locate the land?"
6 Barnes v. Rea (No. 2), 219 Pa. 287 at 296 (1908) ; Shaw v. Cornman, 271 Pa. 260 at 263 (1921);
Traub v. Hartung, 42 Schuy. L.R. 152 (1946); Rice v. Snyder, 51 Lanc. L.R. 327 (1949); Also see:
Felty v. Calhoun, 139 378 (1890); Brown v. Hughes, 244 Pa. 397; Lynn v. Hayden, 119 Mass.
482; Island Coal Co. v. Streitlemier, 139 Ind. 83, 87 N.E. 340.
7 Hammer v. McEldowney, 46 Pa. 334, 336 (1863) ; Mellon v. Davidson, 123 Pa. 298, 302 (1889);
Llewellyn v. Sunnyside Coal Co., 242 Pa. 517 520 (1914); Shaw v. Cornman, 271 Pa. 260, 263
(1921).
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Pennsylvania courts have also referred to the surveyor test.8
There are many examples where the memo or receipt described the real estate
to be sold only by street number, i.e., a system of notation regulated by municipal
laws; presumably a surveyor, or any acquainted citizen, could locate such street
and number where the plot designated by such number is clearly marked; and
the adjoining boundaries would be obvious. Street number cases as sufficient descriptions are many in our state. Such cases are:
"136 S. Third Street"
Flaniganv. Phila. (1866) 51 Pa. 491
"268 S.Second Street"
Fitzpatrick v. Engard (1896) 175 Pa.
"1903 Wynnewood Road"
"300 S.9th Street"
"221 Fifth Street"

393, 298
McDermott v. Reiter (1924) 279 Pa. 545
Persky v. Volicki (1927) 288 Pa. 98
Andre v. Andre (1936) 123 Pa. Super.
597
Sawert v. Lunt (1948) 360 Pa. 521

"305 S.Negley Ave."
Other cases in Pennsylvania have very liberally used the occupancy or source
of title test. Memos were held sufficient in the following cases:
"the Rose pine tract of land bought of Smith and Fleck's App. 69 Pa.
Rose by Thomas Smith and Peter Fleck" 474 (1871)
"land which you (vendee) now occu- Phillips v. Swank 120 Pa. 76
'all the properties of E. J. Unger, de- (1881)
Haupt v. Unger 222 Pa. 439
ceased, together with Heise and Berten- (1909)
et additions"
"land you now occupy"
Shaw v. Cornman (supra)
"a certain tract owned by the female (1921)
signed hereof, situated on East Avenue,
Lake Township, Luzerne Col, fronting Cohen v. Jones 274 Pa. 417
50 feet on East Ave. depth 63 feet"
(1922)
"farm occupied by vendor, only farm
vendor owns, bought of S on 4/1/36,
adjoins vendee's land, and known as Suchan v. Swope9 357 Pa. 16
'Harencane' Farm."
(1947)
Also where the memo refers to a tract of land by name, which is well known,
a surveyor could presumably locate the same using the memo alone. Such cases where
the name was held sufficient are:
"Hotel Duquesne property" Henry v. Black 210 Pa. 245 (1904)
"the Byers Place"
Ranney v. Byers 219 Pa. 332 (1908)
In the Byers case the court said "real estate is frequently given some name by
8 Mellon v. Davidson, 123 Pa. 298, 302 (1889); Shaw v. Cornman, 271 Pa. 260, 263 (1921);
Fleming v. Strayer, 163 Pa. Super. 607 (1949); Traub v. Hartung, 42 Schuy. L.R. 152, 153, 154

(1946).
9 But where as in the Suchan case the vendor voluntarily testifies and verbally amplifies the weak
description in the writing, is not the contract then verbal and not enforceable as a written contract?
(see Sumner v. Thompson infra.)
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which it is known, is described in written instruments, and is recognized by everyone." 10
On the other hand there are many cases in Pennsylvania where the memos
did not fulfill any of the aforementioned tests and specific performance was denied.
Such cases are:
"The houses on Smithfield Street"
"ground fronting about 190 feet on P.
R.R. in 21st ward, Pittsburgh"
"all those certain lots in 19th ward,
Pittsburgh, bounded and described as:
3 lots, Leeter Plan, Nos. 16, 17, and
18, fronting 180 feet on Beatty St.,
depth 200 ft."
"house and lot on Acorn Street."
"30,000 acres on head waters of Elk
River which K purchased from you last
Monday"
"property at No. 3 and Spruce, South
Bethlehem, Pa.,"
"Lot on Main Street in Duryea Boro.,
Luzerne Co., and Improved Silk Mill
formerly Dutton Silk Co."
"317 West Market"
(mere street number, no municipality
designated)
an acre of land at road corner beginning at corner of road and extending
200 feet in front along GettysburgHarrisburg highway, back far enough
to make one acre along the Sydnesburg
Road"
"fifty foot lot on Detwiler Avenue"
"All that certain tract in Lower Oxford
Township, Chester Co., Pa., being the
western part of sellers farm, containing
30 to 35 acres of land, bounded on the
west by the Gill Estate, on the South by
T.R., on the east by Thompson, on the
North by Sumner, description to be
made in accordance with survey to be
made by A. C. Reg. Surveyor.'

Hammer v. McEldowney 46
Pa. 334, 336 (1863)
Mellon v. Davidson 123 Pa.
298, 302 (1889)
Cunningham v. Neeld 198 Pa.
41 (1901)
In re Welsh's App. 45 Pa.
Super. 115 (1911)
Howard v. Innes 253 Pa. 593,

600 (1916)
Weisenberger v. Heubmer 264
Pa. 316 (1919)
O'Connel v. Cease 267 Pa. 288
(1920)
Heller v. Cochran 280 Pa. 479
(1924)
Callahan v. Potelunas 40 Luzerne LR 78 (1948)
Fleming v. Strayer (1949) 163
Pa. Super. 607, 63 Atl. (2)
122;
and
Fleming v. Strayer and Rife
367 Pa. 284, 80 Atl. (2) 786
(1951)
Rice v. Snyder (1949) 51 Lancaster L.R. 327
Sumner v. Thompson 70 D.
and C. 242 (1949)
(Here however plaintiff also
relied on an oral agreement as
to length of two sides--compare Felty v. Calhoun, supra.
and rule that- 'that is certain
which can be made certain.")

10 The "Fleming Farm on French Creek" was cited in Sawert v. Lunt as being a sufficient description
but is not a proper precedent therefor. Statute of Frauds as a defense to vendor was not in issue;
vendee not a party to the memo, memo passed title as among present owner's predecessors. See discussion seq.
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The case of Suchan v. Swope should not be cited as germaine to the issues
in the cases noted in this writing. Although the Statute is not a mere rule of evidence
but is a limitation (based on public policy) upon judicial authority to afford a remedy, the Statute must be pleaded. It must be raised in the pleadings or testimony
by the party to be charged, that is by the vendor. Otherwise its protection is waived
by the vendor."
A reading of the paper books (record) in the Suchan case will show that
the Statute was not raised in the lower court, not in the pleadings, testimony, nor
opinion, and was not raised in the exceptions nor in the assignments of errors to
the appellate court, and therefore was not before the appellate court. 2 Certainly
the Suchan case should not be cited for holding that a receipt for hand money defining the subject matter of the sale as "my farm" is sufficient to satisfy the Statute
of Frauds. Yet the Court in Sawert v. Luni did exactly this, in the discussion, several
times. Is there any basis for such a conclusion?
Ross v. Baker, 72 Pa. 186 (1872) which was referred to in the Sawert case
as a precedent for the decision therein is also not germaine to the issues. In Ross v.
Baker, one Martin sold the farm in question to Stout, but one Canfield put up the
money. Canfield agreed in writing to sell the farm to Ross, this written agreement
called for the "Fleming Farm on French Creek." Baker got a judgment against
Canfield and purchased the land at a sheriff's sale under this judgment, but was
told by the sheriff at the time of the sale that Canfield did not own the land.
Baker then brought ejectment against Ross. To prove the essentials of the transfer to
Ross, Canfield testified as to what was meant by the words "Fleming Farm on
French Creek." Canfield who had signed this memo was the "party to be charged
therein." He alone could raise the Statute as a defense to thie weakness of the memo.
He chose not to do so, he amplified it by his testimony. (Just as the vendor did in
the Suchan case). Baker was thus a stranger to this particular memo; a stranger
to the memo cannot raise the Statute as a defense thereto. (See infra.). Therefore
Ross v. Baker is not a judicial precedent for cases where this type of defense is 'aised
by a vendor. In the Sawert case the court observed that "The Fleming Farm is identified by - - - vendors."
Peart v. Brice, 152 Pa. 277 (1893) also quoted in the Sawert case, is not
applicable hereto. In Peart v. Brice it was mutually agreed by case stated that parol
could be used to prove that a certain farm was the exact farm as described in a deed
specifically referred to, and that certain sketches and drafts could also be used for
purposes of identification of the land in question. Therefore this case is not a
judicial precedent for cases where the vendor raises the Statute of Frauds as a defense
to vendee's suit for performance.
11 Haskell v. Heathcote, 363 Pa. 184 69 A.2d 71 (1950) ; Zlotziver v. Zlotziver, 355 Pa. 299; 49 A.2d
779. See 51 Dick. L. Rev. 194 re establishment of oral contract for real estate where vendor waives
Statute of Frauds as a defense; and cases cited therein.
12 Boyd v. Houghton Co., 269 Pa. 273; Saxon v. McCormick, 278 Pa. 268; Rotunno v. Joseph, 161
Pa. Super. 57; Fleming v. Strayer, 163 Pa. Super. 607.
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1I. Identity of Vendee
The vendee is a necessary party to the contract and the writing must identify
the vendee either by name or by some description serving to identify him with
certainty.
Grafton v. Cummings, 99 U. S. 100 (1897) holds that, "Th'e other party to
the contract must be designated in the same paper signed by the defendant,--so
that the plaintiff can be identified without parol proof." Naturally if the memo
names no vendee, or the receipt no payor, the writing could be passed around like
a street car transfer. In Ottenberg v. Bailey Cigar Company, 1 Pa. D. and C. 768,
the court said that unless the names of both parties appear the contract may be
foisted upon anyone by perjury which is the very thing the Statute was enacted to prevent. This seems to be the rule in most jurisdictions.' 8
Again in Brown v. Hughes, 244 Pa. 397, 90 Atl. 651 (1914), the writing
referred to a grant or conveyance to "you," and since parol would be required
to determine whether you was meant to be singular or plural the court could not
decree specific performance. In Conners Estate, 85 Pa. Super. 19 (1925) the receipt
read-"Received of I.N.D. - - -," and it was argued that the memo did not indicate
if I. N. D. was acting for himself or as agent for another, but the court held that
the reasonable inference was that I. N. D. was acting for himself-"as recipient
(of the receipts) he is identified as the vendee."
III. Lack of Municipality Designation:
In Sawert v. Lunt the court said that the lack of municipality on the receipt
is not fatal. Certain cases have admitted a presumption thereof from fact of name
of a municipality being on the writing thought outside the body thereof.1 4 Furthermore the court in the Sawert case inferred that judicial notice could be taken that
"F" creek mentioned in a memo was within 20 miles of "T" Borough and all
or both in "C" County. On the other hand it is to be noted that in 1924 the
Supreme Court in the case of Heller v. Cochran, supra, would or did not infer or
presume that "317 West Market" meant 317 West Market "Street," although the
municipality was mentioned in this receipt. The court in the Sawert decision distinguished the Heller case, but comparison shows that the receipts in the two cases
are practically indentical.
A county court recently discussed the necessity of the inclusion of the designation of some muincipality in the receipt in Callahanv. Potelunas, 40 Luzerne L. R.
78 (1948). In view of the cases cited in this writing it is believed that this county
court discussion should be correct, however for the time being we must abide by
the Sawert opinion. In Weber v. Adler, 143 N.E. (Il.) 95, it was held that:
"Where the contract is not dated at any place no inference can be drawn as to the lo.
cation of the property as to city, county or state." This seems in accordance with the
13 49 Am. Jur. 337, citing cases from 13 states. See also: Ott v. Heineman, 48 Pitt. L.J. 161.
'4 Fitzpatrick v. Engard, 175 Pa. 393, 402, 34 A. 803; Andre v. Andre, 123 Pa. Super. 597, 604, 187
A. 321.
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"within the instrument itself" rule hereinbefore stated as the law of Pennsylvania.
It may be interesting to note by comparison that in Grakelow v. Kidder, 95 Pa.
Super. 250 (1929) it was held that description of premises not including street, city,
county or state was held insufficient to suport a writ of habere facias possessionem.
Implication as to the municipality would seem no more allowable under the
statute than inference as to other contract essentials.
IV. Time For Performance
In the year 1852 in the case of Soles v. Hickman, 20 Pa. 180, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that "When the law requires a contract to be in writing,
it means th-e complete contract must be proved by the writing. - - - It is verbal

if it requires verbal testimony to sustain it by proving any essential part of it."
In the case of Heller v. Cochran,supra,the memorandum; in addition to being
vague as to whether 317 West Market meant 317 West Market "Street" or 317 West
Market "something else;" was found indefinite as to the terms or time of payment
or time for delivery of the deed. While this case might be cited for the rule that
where the terms of sale are not contained in the memorandum, it is insufficient, there
were other factors in this case, namely the above description of the real estate,
which could have been the main reason for the court's refusing to grant relief.
In the case of Llewellyn v. Sunnyside Coal Company, 242 Pa. 517 (1914)
the court held that where the receipt defines the property, but not the price or other
terms of sale, specific performance will be denied. Again in this case the memorandum did not define the consideration so for that reason alone the decision may
have been against the plaintiff.
In any event recent Supreme Court cases have resolved any doubt in this matter
and have uniformly held "Where no time is fixed for delivery of a deed it is presumed that a reasonable time was intended." 15
V. Several Memorandums as Constituting One Contract
Where several writings are relied upon to constitute the required memorandum, taking as a whole, either by physical attachment or expressed internal reference, they must incorporate all the terms of the contract, to the exclusion of any parol
testimony. In Wright v. Nulton, 219 Pa. 253 (1.908) the court said "the memorandum by itself or by reference to another writing must show the whole contract
0 * * without any aid from parol testimony * * * the several papers by their own
statements must require the union one with another." In Peoples Trust Company v.
Consumers' Coal and Ice Company, 283 Pa. 76 (1925) the real estate was described by abutting lands and a draft attached to the memorandum, while similar memorandums, expressly referred to a "Carpenter's" survey which gave a full and accurate description of the real estate. Parol testimony was used to identify the "Car15 Glover v. Grubbs, 367 Pa. 257 at 259 (1951) ; Marshall Construction Company v. Forsythe, 359
Pa. 8 (1948) ; Detwiler v. Capone, 357 Pa. 495 at 502 (1947).
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penter's" survey which was expressly referred to in the memos. Th present law of
Pennsylvania apparently is as expressed in the Restatement of Contracts, §§ 207
and 208, as follows:
"The memorandum may consist of several writings,
(a) if each writing is signed by the party to be charged and the
writings indicate that they relate to the same transaction, or
(b) though one writing only is signed if
(i) the signed writing is physically annexed to the other writing
by the party to be charged, or
(ii) the signed writing refers to the unsigned writing, or
(iii) it appears from examination of all the writings that the signed
writing was signed with reference to the unsigned writings."
Where the several memorandums sufficiently refer to each other and comply
with the Restatement still if there are discrepancies among the various writings
which would require parol testimony to explain and to thus properly correlate the
various memos, as to one or more of the essentials of the contract, specific performance will be denied.
In the case of Sorber v. Masters, 264 Pa. 682, the two memos relied upon as
constituting one contract recited separate and different considerations. The court
held that the memos taken together must accord in every material particular with
the bargained averred; and parol testimony cannot be used to pardon or explain
discrepancies.
VI. Evidence: Parol; Extrinsic; Presumption.
Not only is parol evidence inadmissible to supply any essential to constitute
a contract, it is also inadmissible to correlate separate writings not physically or
internally connected. This is consistent with the "within the instrument itself"
rule.
The parol evidence rule allows the explanation of certain ambiguities by
parol. But not so where the Statute of Frauds is raised as a defense. "THE RULE
ADMIITING PAROL EVIDENCE TO SUPPLY OMITTED PARTS DOES
NOT APPLY IF THE LAW REQUIRES THE PARTICULAR CONTRACT
TO BE IN WRITING."1 6
To create an interest in land the memo or memos must establish all essentials
of the contract within the instrument itself.17
The question arises as to whether the plaintiff can show that the land sought
is the only real estate the defendant owns according to courthouse records and
hence the memo with the insufficient description must of necessity refer to this
16 Henry, Pa. Trial Evidence, 3rd Ed. (1940) Page 541; Mussellman v. Stoner, 31 Pa. 265 at 270
(1858); Miller v. Fitchthorn, 30 Pa. 252 at 259 (1858).
17 Moore v. Eisaman, 201 Pa. 190, 193 (1902). See also: Soles v. Hickman, 20 Pa. 180; Mellon v.
Davidson, 123 Pa. 189; Barnes v. Rea, 219 Pa. 297; Weisenberger v. Huebuer, 264 Pa. 316; Shaw v.
Cornman, 271 Pa. 260; Fleming v. Strayer, 163 Pa. Super: 607.
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particular tract. It this were allowed the plaintiff would then be proving his case
not only by indirection but also by extrinsic evidence. Pennsylvania cases have
18
held that such negative proof is not permissible.
In regard to the court persuing, inferring or taking judicial notice of certain facts necessary to establish definite contract terms, we note in the Sawert case
the court approved an inference that a certain creek was near a certain borough and
that both were located in a certain county. In contrast to this we note in the Heller
case that the court did not infer that 317 West Market meant -317 West Market
"Street," although in this receipt the city or municipality was definitely stated in
the heading.
We submit that if the plaintiff cannot use parol or other extrinsic evidence to
prove or help prove his contract the court should not be permitted to do it for
him by the use of inference, presumption or judicial notice.
A further question has been raised as to whether the plaintiff, who cannot
use his own verbal testimony, may call the defendant (vendor) upon cross examination and use the defendant's testimony to add missing parts or specificitv to the
contract. In the recent case of Rice v. Snyder, 51 Lancaster Law Review 327, 331; the
court specifically answered this question in the negative. 19
VII. The Statute Is a Defense Only for the Vendor.
It must be remembered at all times that the vendor, the party to be charged;
the one who signed the memo, is the only party who can raise the Statute of Frauds
as a defense. It cannot be raised by a stranger to the memo. This conclusion seems
certain from the terminology of the Statute. A number of cases have maintained
20
this view.
If this be correct then it is readily seen that the Suchan case, and Ross v. Baker,
cited in the Sawert case are not precedents for cases wherein the vendor raises
this defense as against his vendee. Stated otherwise, the Statute of Frauds is a defense personal to the vendor.
VIII. Practice
In the Sawert case the court reasoned that by filing preliminary objections
defendant admitted as true all allegations of the bill, and since the bill alleged that
tHe meager description in the memo actually was intended to represent a certain
property as adequately and fully described in a duly recorded deed, then the description in the deed was in effect in the memo.
If in thus failing to distinguish between truth and admissibility the court really
meant what was actually said such represents a legal theory that is an innovation.
18 Mellon v. Davidson, 123 Pa. 298 (1889); Traub v. Hartung, 42 Schuy. L. R. 152 (1946).
19 See also: Brown, Pennsylvania Evidence (1949), page 148; Coxe v. England, 65 Pa. 212.
20 Houser v. Lamont, 55 Pa. 311 (1867) ; Diffenderfer v. Kremp, 8 Berks Co. 154, 25 Dist. 1011;
also reported in 34 Lancaster 44 (1916) ; 49 AM. JuR., page 896; 9 A.L.R. 2d 177.
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Hereafter every plaintiff will allege that "X" land in the receipt actually was
meant by both parties to represent a tract as adequately described in a duly recorded deed. The defendant wishing to defend on inadequacy of description will have
to swear in an answer that there was no such understanding or agreement. Or defendant will in all such cases forego legal defense and provide plaintiff with a
deed. Preliminary objection:;, under the Sawert theory, will avail the truthful defendant not at all.
Possibly this Sawert reasoning in this regard represents a still further step in
Court's liberal view in specific performance cases. Or if this issue
Supreme
the
were squarely put to the court in a future case would they hold otherwise? At the
most it appears to be mere dicta. If the ultimate result of the Sawert case is alone
the judicial precedent therefrom then we merely add it to the list of street number
cases found sufficient and it is not out of line.
In Traub v. Hartung, 42 Schuylkill L. R. 152, 154 (1946) the court said,
"True-the bill gives a full and sufficient description of the premises. But in ascertaining whether the Statute of Frauds has been satisfied the court must look
in the first instance only at the written agreement: if that being inadequate, the
omission cannot be supplied by the averments of the bill." As was aptly said in
Agnew v. Southern Land Co., 204 Pa. 193, 194,-"the bill only expresses what
the plaintiff desires the contract to mean."
To the statement in the Sawert case that "my farm" (referring to the Suchan
case) is a sufficient description of real 'estate, we ask what lesser description could
a farmer place upon a receipt or sales agreement?

